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 Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under 
External Predation 
Taoxiong Liu   Angang Hu   Bihua Zhou∗ 
(Tsinghua University) 
Abstract:  This paper develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment 
with international conflicts where national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. 
The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players, 
the external predator, the government and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three 
phases, submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium and full-protected equilibrium. Different 
defense strategies result in different growth prospects and sustainable growth will endogenously 
induce adjustment of defense strategies. 
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I. Question and Literature Review 
In the matter of the external environment of economic growth, the mainstream 
economic growth theoretical models pay more attention to international trade and 
transnational capital floating, while conflict behavior among countries is usually out 
of the consideration.1 In fact, the conflict behaviors between countries have never 
stopped, more than that, it is one of the most important research topics on the research 
of international relationship. Empirical studies also have demonstrated its significance 
to country’s economic growth.2 Based on the Conflict Growth Theory, this paper 
makes a long term growth model of a country under the environment of international 
conflicts. Meanwhile, as a basic measure to prevent the external predation, the 
national defense is introduced into the model. This conflict problem is formed by the 
external predation and the internal defense. The focal point of this model is the 
interrelationship of international conflict, national defense and economic growth, and 
the new discovery after the international conflict and national defense are integrated 
in the economic growth model. 
Many scholars have researched on the international conflict by economics 
approach, especially game theory. In economics, the main thought about the 
explanation of international structure is: the emergence of nation-state is the 
equilibrium outcome of the interaction among the allocated resources of defense and 
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 offense.3 The resource allocation in equilibria is an important characteristic which 
shows the balanced relationships among countries, and it has inevitable restriction and 
effect in turn on countries’ development. In Friedman (1977) and Boulding (1963), 
the equilibrium between predation and defense had been analyzed geographically and 
technically. Whenever the equilibrium takes place, it relies on the two actions’ relative 
technical advantages, returns to scale, usable resources and other factors. Hirshleifer 
(1991、2000) had discussed these questions in a generalized framework. And other 
economists (Grossman and Kim, 1995; Skaperdas, 1992; Garfinkel, 1990) have done 
in-depth study on the micro foundation of resource distribution between predation and 
defense in some more special models. 
In the plenty of research on the national defense, both the political and economic 
factors have been emphasized by economists, but they are not going on under the 
framework of economic growth theory. According to economists’ research of defense, 
national defense is public product, whose demand function is similar to the common 
public product, and is different from the private product. There are three categories of 
models of military expenditure demand: the general empirical model, neoclassical 
model and decision making process model.4 The first category is mainly from the 
empirical study, while the third category is mainly from study of the micro decision 
making process of military expenditure. It is the second category which provides 
theoretical reference for the relationship between economic growth and national 
defense, and tells us that, as the result of economic growth, the national income or 
government revenue is the budget constraints of the military expenditure. In this kind 
of model, the national income and outside threat is fixed as external variables. The 
military expenditure’s effect on economic growth is ignored, and it is viewed as the 
investment to produce “security”, which enters the utility function directly and 
determines the total utility together with consumption.  
In this paper, the root of the international conflicts is attributed to the economic 
interest, and it is supposed that the only purpose to pay the military expenditure is to 
protect the native property from being plundered. Besides, the problems about 
security and growth are also brought into the economic growth model. The basic idea 
of this paper is: suppose under a Hobbesian environment in which the countries face 
the possibility of being plundered all the time. The only way to prevent the external 
predation is to invest for the national defense, and the possibility for one country’s 
total income of being protected and being plundered is decided by the success 
function. The economic growth rate depends on the factor accumulation. At 
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 equilibrium, the extent of being protected influences the marginal return, and 
therefore influences the factor accumulation. Then, the country has to face the 
problem of how to optimally allocate resources for consumption, production and 
national defense. It decides the long term equilibrium growth path that attains both 
international conflict equilibrium and the balance among consumption, production 
and national defense. The first part of this paper is on the basic question and literature 
review. The second part describes the structure and character of the basic model. In 
the next part, a dynamic equilibrium solution and relevant analysis are given, and the 
fourth part elaborates the theoretical meaning of model’s result. 
 
II. Basic Model 
The model analyses in the international conflict, how a country which is in a 
protection position attains the equilibrium between the international conflict and the 
internal economic growth, and what its economic growth path looks like. Suppose the 
world political and economical system is under the Hobbesian Rule, there are full of 
conflicts among countries and the only purpose of the international conflicts is to gain 
the economic interest.5 Under this kind of international environment, a country has to 
face many other countries predations all the time. There is a country C which is under 
this system. For simplicity, suppose country C could not plunder other country but try 
to prevent the external predation. In other words, the conflict between country C and 
other countries is a predation-defense problem6. It is a reasonable assumption when 
the country is a developing country or it couldn’t pose a threat to other countries. The 
only way to prevent predation for country C is to invest to the defense department to 
protect the national property. There are three players in this model: external predator, 
the government and representative family of country C. what follows is an 
explanation about their actions. 
 
A. International Conflict 
Country C is facing the conflict with the predators all the time. Assume that the 
proportion that country C’s property is protected from being plundered is decided by 
the predation or defense investment by both sides through the Contest Success 
Function. At time t, the defense expenditure is Fd(t), other countries’ investment to 
plunder C’s property is Fp(t),and assume the Contest Success Function7 as 
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Whenever not inducing confusion, we drop the time variable t. Here p is the 
proportion of C’s property is under protection, θ and F are technical parameters of 
conflict.8 Fd(t) and Fp(t) is the both sides’ conflict investment at time t. As shown in 
the figure, p > 0, when Fd(t) is 0, which means country C would not lose all of its 
property even it gives up defense investment. After all, the predation is condemned 
morally, and it is limited by kinds of factors, such as the international environment, 
the prey and the predator’s internal conditions and cost of wealth transition. Therefore, 
even if the prey is quite weak, the predator could not take all of its property away, and 
F  is used to measure the strength of natural protection when country C spends no 
money on defense. 
 
Fig.1  The Contest Success Function 
 
Denote the per capita predation investment, per capita defense investment and per 
capita strength of natural protection respectively by F, f and f. The Contest Success 
Function is: 
Fff
ffFfp
++
+
=
θ
θ),(  (1) 
This function is called the intensive form of the Contest Success Function. The 
following mainly uses this form. Obviously, the proportion of country C being 
plundered at the time t is: 
Fff
Fp
++
=−
θ
1  
B. The Actions of the Government and Family 
Country C is made up of the government and many symmetrical families. As the 
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 model is not concerned with the predator’s internal government and family, the 
government and family mentioned in this paper refer only to country C which is 
plundered. At time t, country C invests resources to production as well as defense. It 
needs to balance between the cannon and butter. The gross income in each period is 
divided into consumption, investment and defense expenditure, among which, defense 
expenditure is decided by the government while consumption and investment are 
decided by the families.  
Each family population is standardized to be 1. As the total amount of families is 
quite large, we think that the action of a single family has no effect on the aggregate 
variables. So the symmetry of the families makes the solving process much simpler. 
Assume that the government which is responsible for maximizing the family lifetime 
utilities is a rational agent of the public, and finance for defense expenditure by 
lump-sum taxation.9 Because the families are symmetrical, each family contributes f 
to defense expenditure. The national defense is public product, so the protected 
proportion of each family’s output is p. The total capital stock of country C is K, and 
the aggregate production function is Y(K). Each family’s capital, namely the per capita 
capital, is k. The per capita production function is y(k), and is assumed to have the 
linear form Ak. Because of the existence of the external predator, the family could not 
get the overall output, only py(k), the remaining output after being plundered10. 
Therefore, at time t, the family budget constraint, i.e. the capital accumulation 
equation is: 
kcfkyFfpk δ−−−= )(),(&  (2) 
In expression (2), δ is the capital depreciation rate. Expression 2 shows that 
defense expenditure’s influence on economic growth is mainly on two aspects: on one 
hand, the defense expenditure occupies a part of current revenue, so that it may 
suppress consumption and investment; on the other hand, defense expenditure has 
effect on the proportion of the product being protected, so that it influences the long 
term economic growth. Assume that the defense expenditure per capita and the capital 
stock cannot be negative. Each period’s consumption is also not negative as well. 
However, just as other growth models, equilibrium solution will not be negative, so it 
can be ignored here. So  
0≥f                                                      (3) 
0)( ≥tk                                                    (4)11 
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 The family tries to maximize the objective function: 
dtetcuU
tρ−
∞
∫ ⋅= 0 ))((  (3) 
Assume that the current utility function is: 
ccu ln)( =                                                   (6)12 
In a standard growth model, k(0) is a necessary condition. In order to obtain 
meaningful solutions, assume that the parameters satisfy the following conditions: 
ρθ A>  and ))(1()2( δρθθδρθ ++>>+ A  (4) 
In the following text, at first, we don’t take into account the rationality 
assumption for the public government. We try to analyze the characteristics of 
economic growth under the government’s different defense strategy assumption. Then, 
we explain the dynamic equilibrium path when the government’s purpose is to 
maximize the family’s lifetime total utility  
 
C. The Predator’s Action 
Assume that many predators prey on country C’s property and are ready to 
plunder all the time. For simplicity, assume that these predators take the chance 
randomly to plunder country C, and at one time there is one and only one predator. 
There are too many predators that it is difficult to collude with each other. So once a 
predator gain the chance, it will try to maximize the profit from this period’s predation 
since in the next period the predation chance may be gained by another predator. 
Therefore, in this game, the predator’s purpose is to maximize each period’s profit, 
not like country C who considers the infinite horizontal problem. The proportion of 
the property every predator gains from country C is decided by the Contest Success 
Function. Therefore, the predator’s optimization problem is to maximize the net 
revenue. 
Max  ppd FYFFp −− )],(1[  
Because of the assumption of family’s symmetry, the objective function can also 
be written in the form of per capita (of country C), which is: 
Max  FyFfp −− )],(1[  (5) 
s.t.  0≥F . 
Therefore, the model in this paper looks like a partial equilibrium mode. Just as 
Mejia and Posada (2002) said, if there are many external predators and they haven’t 
colluded with each other, it is reasonable to explain the action by partial equilibrium.13 
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 III. The Dynamic Equilibrium 
Even though we have set some simplified assumption to the players, the dynamic 
equilibrium still involves complicated technical problems. In the general setting, the 
model in this paper is not a repeated game model in continuous time. It is because, for 
country C, the production department and conflict department have effect with each 
other in every period, and different investment or output in every period can also 
change the conflict problem in every period. The closest concept to this model is 
differential game, in which the most extensively adopted solution concept is MPE, the 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium.14 The key idea of MPE is: when the players’ profit in 
each period is just related with some of the current state variables and players’ current 
actions, the players’ strategy is assumed related only with these state variables and 
these state variables are called return relevant variable. In other words, the games in 
the past time influence the coming games only through some state variables. 
Whenever the return relevant variables are equal, the following games are totally 
equivalence.  
In this model, the action variables of country C’s government and family are the 
defense expenditure and consumption in each period, namely { }tf  and { }tc . The 
predator’s action variable is{ }tf ,15 the predation investment per period. The key 
point is the choosing of the return relevant variables in the model. Here it is country 
C’s capital stock per capita, namely kt. The reason why it just consist of country C’s 
capital stock but doesn’t consist of capital stock of predators is that the optimization 
problems of defender and predator are different in this one-to-many game. The 
predators pursue the maximization of profits, while the defenders pursue the 
maximization of the family lifetime utilities. According to expression (8), the 
predator’s return per period only has relationship with the defender’s output in that 
period which is related to the current capital stock and the current action variables (f, 
F). Therefore the predator’s return relevant variable only needs to consider the 
defender’s capital stock k, but not its own capital stock. Obviously, the current return  
per period (consumption’s current utility) of family in country C is only decided by 
the current consumption. So, in the game, the return relevant variable only consists of 
country C’s capital stock. Assume that the strategies of both sides are just the return 
relevant variable’s function, i.e. c(k), f(k) and F(k). Meanwhile, in order to avoid 
being confused, the values of c, f and F at time t are denoted as ct, ft and Ft, and k is 
still the function of time, denoted as k(t). 
When other players’ MPE strategies are given, the predator’s problem is to solve 
the problem in expression (8), and the problem of country C’s government is to 
choose ft to maximize the family utility, and the family’s problem is to maximize 
expression (5) under the constraints of expression (2), (3) and (7). 
The following paragraphs are primary analyses on family i’s optimization 
problem under the condition that other players’ strategies have been given. The 
current-value Hamilton Equation: 
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According to the assumption of the predator and government’s MPE strategies, f 
and F are only related to the per capita capital k. While the change of a single family’s 
capital has no effect on k, i.e. 0)( =∂∂ ikkf  and 0)( =∂∂ ikkF . From the symmetry, 
at the equilibrium, we have k=ki. Therefore, the first-order conditions for a 
representative family can be written as: 
0)( =−′ µcu
 (7) 
]),([ δµρµµ −−= AFfp&
 (8) 
At the same time, slackness condition and transversality condition are written: 
0,0 =≥ fλλ  (9) 
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According to the expression (11), the economic system’s evolution is related to 
the predator and government’s strategies. In the following paragraphs, to solve the 
economic growth path, assume directly that the government and predator adopt 
corresponding three kinds of typical dynamic strategies (MPE strategies). And then 
the following paragraphs explain how these strategies form a dynamic game 
equilibrium solution, and analyze the corresponding equilibrium growth path. 
 
A. Conflict Strategy and the Growth Path 
1. The growth path under tolerant strategy 
Assume directly that the predator and government’s tolerant strategies under the 
dynamic game are as following (The superscript “*” shows the value under tolerant 
strategy): 


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Obviously, in order for the existence of the government’s strategy, assume that 
the following inequality holds all the time. 
fky 2
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θ
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 From expression (1), we have:  
)1(),( * θθ +== pFfp   
In other words, under the assumed condition that both the predator and 
government adopt the strategy )(* kf  and )(* kF , the protected proportion of 
country C’s output is always p*. It is clear that under the tolerant strategy, country C 
can spend part of its resources on national defense, but part of its output is still 
plundered. Therefore, its defense expenditure is limited. This is what the word 
“tolerant” really means.  
Theorem 1. Assume that the government and predator adopt the tolerant 
strategy, and )()1()0( 22 θθ Afk +> , then there is the unique equilibrium 
growth path. On the path, the capital and consumption always have positive 
growth rate. Moreover, consumption’s growth rate is fixed, and expressions (15) 
to (17) hold. 
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For the proof, see the appendix.16 The initial consumption is given in expression 
(17), and expression (16) gives a policy function of c with respect to k on the 
equilibrium path. Therefore, the family’s optimal MPE strategy is given as well as the 
predator and government’s strategies are given as f*(k) and F*(k). Although the 
chosen return relevant variable is capital per capita when we define the MPE strategy, 
accurately speaking, in the process to get expression (16), k should be the capital of 
the considered family. But under the family symmetry condition, these two things are 
equal. 
Since there is only one equilibrium growth path, we can get a policy function 
c*(k) according to this path, as expression (16). 
 
2. Growth path under the submissive strategy 
The superscript “&” shows the value under the subject strategy. Assume directly 
that the predator and government’s MPE strategies are as follows: 
0)(& =kf  (15) 
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Now country C’s defense expenditure is always zero, this is what the word 
“submissive” means. In order to guarantee the validation of expression (19), assume 
always that: 
fky ≥)(  (17) 
Theorem 2. Assume that the government and predator adopt the submissive 
strategy, and Afk /)0( ≥ , then there is the unique equilibrium growth path, 
which is tending to the stable status. In the stable status, the values of capital and 
consumption are determined by expression (21) and (22). 
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For the proof, see the appendix. Since there is only one equilibrium growth path, 
we can get a policy function c&(k) according to this path, as expression (22). 
3. The growth under the friendly strategy. 
The idea here is that there is no conflict under the friendly strategy. Both the 
predator and the government don't invest anything into conflict. The superscript “#” 
shows the value under the friendly strategy. Assume directly that the predator and 
government’s MPE strategies are as follows: 
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According to the expression (1), p=1. Now, the model is a standard neoclassical 
Ak growth model, meanwhile the following theorem is presented: 
Theorem 3.  Assume that the government and predator adopt the friendly 
strategy, then the economic system has the unique equilibrium growth path, on 
which both the consumption and investment have constant growth rate, and the 
expressions (24) and (25) hold. 
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For the proof, see the appendix. Since there is only one equilibrium growth path, 
we can get a policy function c#(k) according to this path, as expression (25). 
4. The growth path under the fully-protected strategy 
The superscript “＄” shows the variable’s value under the fully-protected 
 strategy. Assume that the predator and government adopt the fully-protected strategy, 
as follows: 
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The basic idea to give this strategy is: country C chooses a proper defense input, 
so that the predator’s best response is to give up predation given the defense input. 
Obviously, p=1 under the strategies described in expression (26), which means that 
the output is protected completely.  
Theorem 4. Assume that the government and predator adopt the 
fully-protected strategy, then the economic system has the unique equilibrium 
growth path, on which the consumption has constant positive growth rate, 
capital growth rate tends to the consumption growth rate, and there are equation 
(27) and (28). 
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For the proof, see the appendix. Consumption grows at a constant rate, the same 
as the one under the friendly strategy, under which there is no conflict input. This is 
because that under both of the situations, the outputs are full protected. The difference 
is that country C has to input part of its resources into defense here. The capital 
growth rate tends to the consumption growth rate asymptotically, and the policy 
function for c, c$(k) has its new form as well. 
 
B. MPE Dynamic Equilibrium Growth Path 
According to the above discussion, with different conflict strategies assumptions 
of the government and predator, there are different equilibrium growth paths for the 
economy. When the government and predator adopt the tolerant strategy and friendly 
strategy, consumption has a constant positive growth rate all along, and the growth 
rate under friendly strategy is higher. While under the submissive strategy, the 
economy tends to a stable state in which both consumption and capital are fixed. 
However, for these cases, the equilibria are still only equilibria for resources 
allocation between consumption and investment. The complete equilibrium needs to 
consider that whether the international conflicts are at the state of equilibrium. Here is 
a MPE strategy which attains equilibrium in both international and domestic level, 
and all of the above growth paths may appear in this equilibrium. 
Theorem 5  The following strategy is a MPE equilibrium: 
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For the proof, see the appendix. 
The equilibrium path should consist of three phases. In the “c-k” diagram (shown 
in Fig. 2), corresponding to the heavy line in the figure, obviously we have the 
conclusions:  
 
Fig. 2 The growth path in the dynamic equilibrium 
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(1)  When Afk ≤ , all players’ strategies refer to the situation of friendly 
strategy. Therefore, there is no conflict and no property being plundered. Both the 
consumption per capita and capital per capita have constant positive growth rate. 
(2)  When )()( 221 θθ Afk +> , all players’ strategies refer to the situation of 
tolerant strategy. A fixed proportion of the output is plundered, consumption per 
capita has a constant positive growth rate, and c is linear with k. 
(3)  When )()( 221 θθ AfkAf +≤< , all players’ strategies refer to the 
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Therefore, the economy must reach the growth path under the tolerant strategy before 
it reaches the stable state.  
Obviously, the above-mentioned phases take place in sequence. The key point is 
that the growth rates in all phases since beginning is greater than 0, so that k can keep 
going up from k(0) until the time when it is greater than k&. In the equilibrium path’s 
first phase, namely the friendly equilibrium phase, the condition to ensure a positive 
growth rate is the same to the classical growth model. More important is the condition 
that ensures the economy to evolve from the second phase, namely submissive 
equilibrium phase into the tolerant equilibrium phase. As part of the expression (7), 
))(( δρθθ ++> 1A , i.e. )()( δρδρθ −−+> A . This condition not only ensures 
the tolerant equilibrium phase’s growth rate is positive, but also ensures the above 
expression holds. Therefore, the economy can reach the growth path under the 
tolerant strategy before the economy reaches the stable state. As mentioned previously, 
θ is used to measure the both sides’ relative level of technology in conflict, in other 
words, it is possible to reach the tolerant equilibrium path only if country C’s defense 
technology is above a particular level. Besides, the greater the ρ and δ are, the higher 
the lowest-needed value of θ. It means that when the future is less important, there 
must be a higher value of θ to ensure the motivation to pursue the long term positive 
growth rate.17 
C. Fully-protected Dynamic Equilibrium 
In part B, we give a dynamic MPE equilibrium of the model, and on the 
equilibrium growth path, country C’s economy will tend to a constant positive growth 
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 For how these parameters influence the equilibrium in different phases, it can be illustrated by solving with 
numerical values. Due to limitations on space, it is left out here. Someone who needs it can get in touch with the 
author. 
 rate at last. But in this MPE equilibrium, only when the capital stock is extremely low 
can the economy be free from being plundered, and as the output increases, there is a 
fixed proportion of output being plundered all along after the economy reaches the 
tolerant equilibrium growth path. It is likely that the conclusion is inconsistent with 
our intuition, because after a country grows strong enough, it should have ability to 
protect its output completely. The following paragraphs will give a subgame perfect 
dynamic equilibrium, called the fully-protected equilibrium, in which the output is 
protected completely, and then prove that this equilibrium can only appear after k is 
large enough. Meanwhile, the subgame perfect dynamic equilibrium in part B is 
called the basic MPE equilibrium. The following theorem can be proved. 
Theorem 6. When θ is high enough and k(0) is large enough, there is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium, as follows: 
The predator’s strategy: if country C’s government always chooses 
)($ kff =  in the whole history, it chooses )($ kFF = in the current period; if 
country C’s government has ever violated it before, it chooses the basic MPE 
strategy. 
The country C government’s strategy: if its own decision meets )($ kff =  
in the whole history, it keeps choosing )($ kf ; if it has ever violated )($ kff =  
before , it chooses the basic MPE strategy. 
The family’s strategy: if the government always chooses )($ kff =  in the 
whole history, it chooses )($ kcc = ; if the government has ever violated it before, 
it chooses the basic MPE strategy. 
For the proof, see the appendix. 
It should be pointed out that this equilibrium has not been a strict MPE, for the 
strategies of both sides are related not only to k (Return Relevant Variable), but also to 
what have happened before. On the equilibrium path, country C’s output is protected 
completely. this is what the fully-protected strategy and fully-protected equilibrium 
means. This equilibrium is interpreted as that in order to obtain a better position, 
country C promises a defense input, and predator can judge whether the promise is 
credible or not by the history and makes its choice. The crucial step in the proof is to 
illustrate country C’s promise is enforceable by itself (namely credible). Because that 
it will turn to the basic MPE if the promise is violated, and compared with the 
fully-protected equilibrium, in the basic MPE, k and c will have higher level in the 
current period but the growth rate will be always lower from this period on. Therefore, 
when k(0) is large enough, the loss will always outweigh the gain whenever the 
government violates )($ kf  and turn to the basic MPE. 
Theorem 7.  When θ is high enough, the fully-protected equilibrium is 
better than the basic MPE equilibrium for country C (including government and 
family). 
For the proof, see the appendix. This theorem illustrates that, if the government 
is a rational agent of families, when the capital stock reaches a certain level, the 
government prefers the fully-protected equilibrium growth path to the basic MPE 
growth path. As showed in Fig. 2, the last part of the heavy line (the basic MPE 
 growth path) is replaced by the dashed line with arrow. 
While the key condition to realize the fully-protected equilibrium is a high 
enough θ, which makes country C realize fully-protected with less proportion of 
resources. In this way, though the proportion of consumption in the gross output is 
lower than the proportion in the tolerant equilibrium growth path, what is gained is 
more than what is lost in the long term, because a higher growth rate makes the future 
gross output  larger. However, if the value of θ could not reach the requirement, the 
proportion of input to realize full protection of the output is too high and the 
proportion of consumption in the output is too low. Though it makes fully-protected 
equilibrium growth path has a higher growth rate, it still worsens the welfare than 
tolerant equilibrium growth path. 
 
IV. Theoretical implications 
This paper provides an analytical framework in which the international conflict 
and domestic growth are integrated in one model. It explains how to optimize the 
distribution of resources between the production and defense activities and the 
possible economic growth paths. This model has following theoretical implications at 
least. 
A. Determinant of Long Term Growth 
Nowadays, international circumstance is full of Hobbesian Rule and the conflicts 
have never disappeared. This model illustrates that the existence of external predator 
may make country C’s growth in a very different way. Even if a country has good 
enough interior market environment and production technology so that it can achieve 
stable economic growth without international conflict, it will have a lower growth rate, 
and even couldn’t achieve long term stable growth while there is external predator. 
Therefore, in the environment of international conflict, a country’s long term 
growth is the result of the interaction of international factors and internal factors. 
Long term equilibrium growth path is co-determined by the equilibrium of 
international conflicts and the balance between domestic consumption and investment. 
This country has to decide how to distribute its resource reasonably between the 
production and national defense all the time. The external predation may reduce 
economic marginal output, so what growth phase does this country locate in is 
decided by this country’s position in the international conflict equilibrium. 
In the submissive equilibrium, this country doesn’t pay the defense expenditure, 
or the defense expenditure is kept in a low level which can be ignored by the predator. 
(In reality, it can also be illustrated as that the limited military expenditure is only 
used to keep the internal social order.) In this situation, though the country has a 
positive growth rate in the primary phase, as the increase of its output, its temptation 
to the external world becomes larger. Then there are more external predation and the 
level of economic security reduces. If it doesn’t adjust security strategy, this country 
has to pay more and more “rent” to other country in exchange for its peace. Therefore, 
the proportion of being plundered increases, actual capital marginal return decreases 
and economic growth rate decreases gradually. If the government’s national defense 
 strategy refuses to adjust, the economy will reach a fixed stable state at last. In the 
tolerant equilibrium, the government has to balance carefully all along between the 
security policy and growth policy. On one hand, national defense expenditure and this 
country’s gross output show relatively stable linear relation, i.e., the defense 
expenditure climbs with the increase of gross output. On the other hand, this country 
will still tolerate part of its property is being plundered by predator. Under the 
condition of high enough defense technology parameter and production technology 
parameter, the economy can realize long term stable growth. But the growth rate is 
lower than the growth rate in the neoclassical model without external predation. In the 
fully-protected equilibrium, the government invests a larger portion’s output to the 
national defense, and the defense expenditure is positive correlated with gross output. 
The property of this country is totally safe. If the defense technology parameter and 
production technology parameter are high enough, the economy can also attain a 
stable growth rate which is higher than the one in the tolerant equilibrium and is the 
same as the one under the environment without conflict. However, there is still a part 
of resource which is distributed to the national defense department all along. The 
direct cause leading these phases’ transition in equilibrium is the capital stock’s 
accumulation, which makes the defender has ability to realize a higher defense level. 
The mechanism is that higher defense technology parameter makes the realization of 
higher defense level become a better choice when the capital accumulation has 
reached a certain level. 
 
B. The Mechanism of Interaction between Growth and Defense 
Expenditure. 
In terms of defense expenditure’s influence on economic growth, the existing 
research mainly involves two aspects’ mechanisms: the one is defense expenditure 
causes a part of resource flow into defense department from production department, 
the other one is that as the defense department itself is productive, it can contribute 
product and its activities has positive externality to the productive department. In this 
paper’s model, the first one still exists. In the tolerant equilibrium and fully-protected 
equilibrium, there is always a part of resource which flows into defense department. 
The second influence is ignored in this model. Empirical research shows that for 
many developing countries, there are no sufficient evidences to show that the defense 
expenditure has positive externality on production. More important, the model in this 
paper describes a third influence mechanism, which is also one of the crucial 
innovations of this model, namely defense expenditure’s influence on domestic 
marginal production return. In terms of the modern economic growth theory, the key 
point to the long term growth rate is the factors’ marginal return. Therefore, the third 
influence mechanism described by this model is more essential to a country’s long 
term economic growth path. The basic process is that the external predation allowed 
by economic insecurity will decrease the expected factors marginal return. The 
increase of defense expenditure improves the economic security, that is to say the 
expected factors marginal return increases, so that the long term growth rate is also 
improved. There is no doubt that, defense expenditure of the country that is plundered 
 and the predator’s predation expenditure interacts with each other. In the equilibrium, 
the factors marginal return decides the long term growth rate.18 
In terms of economic growth’s influence on defense expenditure, we can analyze 
the fundamental influence way from the sides of supply and demand. In terms of 
supply, the improvement of gross output relaxes the agent’s budget constraint, so that 
the country has the ability to input more resource to national defense. In terms of 
demand, every improvement of the output makes the defense become more valuable. 
The temptation for the external predators is increasing, which cause much more 
predation and raise the degree of economic insecurity. So the demand to defense 
expenditure is raised. In the document on the defense expenditure, though they have 
paid attention to the external threat, generally, the external threat’s seriousness is 
considered as exogenous one. While in the model of this paper, by the conflict’s 
equilibrium analysis, the exogenous threat is endogenized. In other words, changes of 
this country’s wealth have effect on the external threat so that the process in which the 
economic growth influences the economic growth has been explored deeper. 
Meanwhile, from the model, we can get a more important new insight: because the 
sustainable economic growth is companied by continuous accumulation of the capital 
stock, so it may cause one country’s adjustment of defense strategy. This point will be 
discussed specifically in the following paragraphs. 
 
C. The Optimal Growth: Balance between Safety and Development 
Since different equilibriums appear while the capital stock accumulates 
continuously, in different developing phases of a country, its government may face 
different options. When the capital stock is very low, according to theorem 1, having 
no other choice, the government has to choose the submissive strategy and give up the 
defense input. Because at that time, this country is so poor that the predators are not 
very interested in it. So the country’s best choice is to rely only on the natural 
protection state. At that time, though the economy is unsafe, it can realize positive 
growth. When the gross capital stock increases to meet the requirement in Theorem 1, 
it is better for the government to choose to invest in national defense because if it 
adheres to the submissive strategy, economy will stop growing at last. If it switches to 
tolerant strategy, its safety will not become worse though it is still unsafe,, and it still 
has the possibility to realize continuous stable growth. As the capital stock becomes 
larger, though tolerant equilibrium still exists theoretically, Theorem 7 illustrates that 
the whole society’s welfare will be improved if it adopts fully-protected strategy. So 
this model predicts that the best growth path needs government to balance between 
security policy and development policy. A rational government should adopt different 
defense strategies in different development phases. When it is poor and less developed, 
it is more likely to choose the submissive strategy; after it has developed to a certain 
level, it is more likely to choose the tolerant strategy; and after it is strong enough, 
fully-protected strategy is a better choice. 
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 If defense expenditure is financed by marginal taxation, the increase of defense expenditure will also bring 
down the private investment’s marginal return. This influence is involved in many literatures. However, in this 
paper, we assume that the defense expenditure is financed by lump-sum taxation. For details, see the illustration in 
Section II-B. 
 The external environment also limits one country’s policy choice. In this model, 
the quality of the external environment is mainly measured by f . First of all, in all 
of the equilibriums, the higher f is, the less the defense expenditure is, and the more 
the resource will be used in consumption and production. Therefore, the social 
welfare will be improved. Secondly, according to Theorem 5, the more important 
meaning of f is that: it determines what kind of equilibrium growth path will arise as 
the amount of capital stock lies in some interval. For example, the higher the value of 
f  is, the earlier the government can adopt fully-protected strategy, so that it can 
obtains a higher growth rate. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The paper tries to build a long term growth model in the environment with 
international conflicts. The analysis here shows that: 
A country’s long term growth is the result of the interactions of international 
factors and domestic factors. The long term equilibrium growth path is co-determined 
by the equilibrium of international conflicts and the balance between domestic 
consumption and investment.. 
According to the different characteristics of conflict equilibrium, equilibrium 
growth path may shows into three phases, namely submissive equilibrium growth 
phase, tolerant equilibrium growth phase and fully-protected equilibrium growth 
phase. When the initial capital stock is very low, it is in submissive equilibrium 
growth phase in which there is always a part of wealth being plundered without 
defense investment, and the higher the output is, the lower the economic growth rate 
is. When the capital stock increase to a higher level, it enters tolerant equilibrium 
growth path, in which there is positive defense expenditure and a fixed proportion’s 
output being plundered while the economy still has a positive growth rate in stable 
state. When the capital stock is high enough, the fully-protected equilibrium growth 
path may exist and defense expenditure is increased until external predation is 
prevented completely, and the stable growth rate is higher than in the tolerant 
equilibrium. 
The government’s different defense strategies lead to different growth scenarios. 
The equilibrium growth path needs the government to balance security policy and 
growth policy. Continuous economic growth will cause endogenous adjustment of 
defense strategy, because a rational government will choose different strategies in 
different development phases. When the country is poor and backward, it chooses the 
submissive strategy. After it develops to a certain level, it switches to the tolerant 
strategy. When it is strong enough, the fully-protected strategy is a better choice. 
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